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Reasons to Not Believe (and Reasons to Act)* 
BLAKE ROEBER 
University of Notre Dame 
It’s an honor to comment on Stewart Cohen’s paper “Reasons to Believe and Reasons 
to Act.” I read “How to be a Fallibilist” and “Contextualist Solutions to 
Epistemological Problems” as an undergraduate, and I have learned from Cohen’s 
work since. It is consistently interesting and compelling. “Reasons to Believe and 
Reasons to Act” is no exception. While my comments here are mostly critical, I find 
many of its central ideas convincing.  
In “Reasons to Believe and Reasons to Act,” Cohen argues that balance of reasons 
accounts of rational action get the wrong results when applied to doxastic attitudes. 
Specifically, he argues that we get counterexamples to BALANCE (below) when we 
apply it to belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgement. 
BALANCE: S is rationally permitted to φ just in case her reasons to φ are at 
least as strong as her reasons to not φ, and she is rationally required to φ just 
in case her reasons to φ are stronger than her reasons to not φ. 
According to Cohen, unless there are non-evidential reasons to withhold belief, 
BALANCE entails that S will be rationally permitted to believe p in cases where she is 
clearly rationally required to withhold. Specifically, it entails that S will be rationally 
permitted to believe p in cases where her evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p. 
But first, says Cohen, it seems doubtful that there are non-evidential reasons to 
withhold. The best reasons for thinking that there are come from Schroeder’s cases 
involving practical interests, forthcoming evidence, and the mental resources required 
for forming a belief, but none of these cases provides a clear example of non-
evidential reasons to withhold. And second, says Cohen, even if one of these cases 
does provide a clear example of non-evidential reasons to withhold, these reasons to 
withhold will often be inoperative. The result will be that BALANCE still entails that S 
will be rationally permitted to believe p in some cases where her evidence for p equals 
her evidence for ¬p. Things get even worse for BALANCE, however, says Cohen. Even 
if we waive these worries, BALANCE entails that one may be rationally permitted to 
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take multiple doxastic attitudes toward a proposition, and it will often get the wrong 
result in cases where someone is simply not considering a proposition. Because 
BALANCE gets the right results when applied to action—or, at least, because it gets the 
right results when applied to relevantly analogous cases of action—Cohen concludes 
that there are important differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act. 
I agree with Cohen that Schroeder’s cases involving practical interests, forthcoming 
evidence, and the mental resources required for forming a belief do not provide clear 
examples of non-evidential reasons to withhold, and I also agree with Cohen that, 
even if they did, these reasons would often be inoperative. I am not yet convinced, 
however, that there are important differences between reasons to believe and reasons 
to act. In these comments, I will try to resist each of Cohen’s objections to BALANCE. 
First, I will argue that BALANCE does not entail that S will be rationally permitted to 
believe p in some cases where her evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p. Second, I 
will argue that there are cases where more than one doxastic attitude seems rationally 
permissible. And third, I will argue that BALANCE gets the right results in cases where 
someone is not considering a proposition, unless it gets the wrong results in 
analogous cases involving action. I will conclude by presenting a tempting positive 
argument for the conclusion that there are important differences between reasons to 
believe and reasons to act. As I will argue, the central premise of this argument—what 
people often call ‘transparency’—can be doubted.   
1. Reasons to Withhold  
Believing ¬p is not the only way to not believe p. As Cohen, Schroeder (2012), and 
others point out, I might withhold with respect to p. A natural thought is that, if my 
evidence for p equals my evidence for ¬p, then I have a decisive reason to not believe 
p, since this fact gives me a decisive reason to withhold with respect to p. With this in 
mind, consider the conjunction of BALANCE and EQ, below.  
(EQ)  If S’s evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p, then S’s reasons to not 
believe p are stronger than her reasons to believe p.  
According to BALANCE, if the consequent of EQ is true—if S’s reasons to not believe 
p are stronger than her reasons to believe p—then S is rationally required to not 
believe p. Thus, together, BALANCE and EQ entail that, if S’s evidence for p equals her 
evidence for ¬p, then S is rationally required to not believe p. Unless the conjunction 
of BALANCE and EQ entails a contradiction, the conjunction of BALANCE and EQ 
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therefore does not entail that S will be rationally permitted to believe p in cases where 
her evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p. If this conjunction does not entail that S 
will be rationally permitted to believe p in cases where her evidence for p equals her 
evidence for ¬p, however, then BALANCE does not entail that S will be rationally 
permitted to believe p in cases where her evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p. 
(In general, if the conjunction of A and B does not entail C, then A does not entail 
C.) Thus, so long as the conjunction of BALANCE and EQ does not entail a 
contradiction, BALANCE does not entail that S will be rationally permitted to believe p 
in cases where her evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p. 
Cohen would say that the conjunction of BALANCE and EQ does entail a 
contradiction. EQ is necessarily false if false at all. If EQ is necessarily false, then the 
conjunction of BALANCE and EQ is also necessarily false. Since necessary falsehoods 
entail every proposition, the conjunction of BALANCE and EQ entails a contradiction 
if EQ is false. And according to Cohen, EQ is false.  
A natural assumption is that one’s reasons to believe consist in one’s evidence. It is important to 
see that, as Schroeder notes, evidence is always evidence for some proposition, i.e., evidence for p 
or for ¬p. There cannot be evidence for not believing p that is not evidence for ¬p. Thus if reasons 
to believe are evidence, whether one has sufficient reason to believe will depend on the relative 
strength of one’s reasons to believe p and one’s reasons to believe ¬p. (p. 3) 
On this way of thinking, EQ cannot be true, since S’s evidence for p equals her 
evidence for ¬p iff her reasons to believe p equal her reasons to not believe p. I agree 
with Cohen that evidence for p is a reason to believe p, but I balk at the crucial third 
sentence of his argument. Where Cohen says “[t]here cannot be evidence for not 
believing that is not evidence for ¬p,” I assume he means that there cannot be reasons 
for not believing p that are not evidence for ¬p. (After all, if “evidence is always 
evidence for some proposition,” as Cohen says, then evidence for ¬p cannot be 
evidence for not believing p, since not believing p isn’t a proposition.) It seems false, 
however, that there cannot be reasons for not believing p that are not evidence for ¬p. 
Consider the following argument.1  
                                                            
1 This argument takes its cue from Schroeder’s (2012, p. 276) argument that reasons to withhold cannot be 
evidence. I do not draw the same conclusion as Schroeder, however. While I conclude that facts about 
one’s evidence can be reasons to withhold that are not themselves evidence, Schroeder concludes that reasons 
to withhold do not even “come from” one’s evidence. Since facts about one’s evidence presumably “come 
from” one’s evidence, Schroeder seems to think that facts about one’s evidence cannot be reasons to 
withhold.  
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Since withholding with respect to p requires neither believing p nor believing ¬p, r 
is a reason to withhold with respect to p only if r is neither a reason to believe p nor a 
reason to believe ¬p. But r is evidence for p only if r is a reason to believe p, and r is 
evidence for ¬p only if r is a reason to believe ¬p. So, r is a reason to withhold with 
respect to p only if r is neither evidence for p nor evidence for ¬p. Any reason to 
withhold with respect to p would be a reason to not believe p, however. So, there are 
reasons to withhold with respect to p only if there are reasons to not believe p that are 
not evidence for ¬p. Are there reasons to withhold with respect to p, then? Yes. Let p 
be some proposition that I cannot rationally believe without evidence (e.g. that it will 
rain tomorrow), suppose that I do have some evidence for p, but suppose that my 
evidence for p is perfectly counterbalanced by equal evidence for ¬p, so that my 
credence in p should be exactly 0.5. This fact about my evidence (call it ‘f’) is a 
paradigm reason for me to withhold with respect to p.2 But this fact is not itself 
evidence for or against p. Evidence for p is evidence against ¬p, and vice versa. If f is 
evidence for p, then f is evidence against ¬p, in which case f is not evidence for ¬p. 
Since f lends equal support to both p and ¬p (if it lends any support to either of them), 
f is evidence for both of them if it’s evidence for either of them. Since it can’t be 
evidence for both of them—it’s evidence for one only if it’s evidence against the 
other—it’s not evidence for either of them.3 Thus, f is a reason to withhold with 
respect to p that is not evidence for ¬p. And since any reason to withhold with respect 
to p is a reason to not believe p, it follows that there are reasons to not believe p that 
are not evidence for ¬p.  
Are there are non-evidential reasons to withhold, then? This depends on their 
nature—specifically, on whether NER1 or NER2 (below) gives us the correct account 
of non-evidential reasons to withhold.   
(NER1)  r is a non-evidential reason for S to withhold with respect to p iff r is 
a reason for S to withhold with respect to p that is neither evidence 
for p nor evidence for ¬p.  
(NER2)  r is a non-evidential reason for S to withhold with respect to p iff r is 
a reason for S to withhold with respect to p that is neither evidence 
                                                            
2 Here and throughout, I will use ‘fact’ as shorthand for ‘true proposition.’ If true propositions cannot be 
reasons, then I invite the reader to adjust my argument accordingly.   
3 And plausibly, it doesn’t support either of them either. My evidence for p supports p, and my evidence for 
¬p supports ¬p. Plausibly, neither p nor ¬p gets any additional support from f, the fact that my evidence for 
p equals my evidence for ¬p.  
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for p, nor evidence for ¬p, nor some fact about S’s evidence for and 
against p.  
If NER1 gives the correct account of non-evidential reasons to withhold, then there 
are non-evidential reasons to withhold, since f is one of them. If NER2 gives the 
correct account of non-evidential reasons to withhold, however, then f is not a non-
evidential reason to withhold, and the fact that f is a reason to withhold is not itself a 
reason to believe in non-evidential reasons to withhold. Cohen does not say exactly 
what he means by ‘non-evidential reasons to withhold.’ For my own part, I don’t see 
any reason to prefer NER1 over NER2, so I’m happy to accept NER2 and say that 
reasons to withhold that are not themselves evidence needn’t be non-evidential 
reasons to withhold. This way I can agree with Cohen that we lack clear examples of 
non-evidential reasons to withhold.  
Either way, however, Cohen’s first objection to BALANCE is not compelling. 
According to this objection, BALANCE entails that S will be rationally permitted to 
believe p in cases where her evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p, since non-
evidential reasons to withhold don’t exist. If NER1 gives the correct account of non-
evidential reasons to withhold, Cohen is right about the connection between 
BALANCE and the existence of non-evidential reasons to withhold, but he’s wrong 
about the existence of non-evidential reasons to withhold, since f is a non-evidential 
reason to withhold. On the other hand, if NER2 gives the correct account of non-
evidential reasons to withhold, Cohen might be right about the existence of non-
evidential reasons to withhold, but he’s wrong about the connection between 
BALANCE and the existence of non-evidential reasons to withhold—for in this case 
BALANCE is consistent with EQ even if non-evidential reasons to withhold don’t 
exist. Either way, BALANCE survives Cohen’s first objection.4   
                                                            
4 After concluding that BALANCE does entail that S is rationally permitted to believe p if her evidence for p 
equals her evidence for ¬p, Cohen also says this:  
[BALANCE] could avoid this result if (implausibly) reasons to suspend always trump reasons to 
believe. But this would present a dilemma. Either there are always reasons to suspend or there are 
not. If the former, then it would never be rational to believe p. If the latter, then there will be cases 
where one has equally strong reasons to believe p and to believe ¬p and yet one is rationally 
permitted to believe p. (p. 7) 
Cohen seems right here, but the point of the preceding argument is that BALANCE could also avoid this 
result if EQ is true. According to EQ, if S’s evidence for p equals her evidence for ¬p, she has a reason to 
not believe p that trumps her reasons to believe p. EQ does not say that there are always reasons to suspend, 
however, or that reasons to suspend always trump reasons to believe. This means that, while BALANCE 
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2. The Rational Permissibility of Multiple Attitudes  
Cohen’s second objection to BALANCE is that one may be rationally permitted to take 
multiple doxastic attitudes toward a proposition if BALANCE is true. Here is Cohen’s 
argument.  
[BALANCE] views requirement as unique permissibility. When one is permitted, but not require to 
believe p, one is also permitted to suspend on p and perhaps even to believe ¬p. This follows from 
the fact that one’s reasons for adopting these attitudes are equal in strength. But on the standard 
view, one’s evidence can support only one doxastic attitude toward p—either belief, disbelief, or 
suspension. It is very hard to see how one’s evidence could support believing p while also 
supporting suspending on p, let alone how one’s evidence could support believing p while also 
supporting believing ¬p. (p. 8) 
I agree with Cohen that BALANCE it entails that one may be rationally permitted to 
believe p and simultaneously rationally permitted to not believe p, but I think this may 
be exactly the right result. Or, at least, I think this result is just as plausible as its 
analogue for action: that one may be rationally permitted to perform some action and 
simultaneously rationally permitted to not perform that action. I think there may be 
cases where one’s evidence rules out disbelief, while providing equal support to belief 
and suspension. I will consider a case like this below. But notice first what BALANCE 
does and does not say. Since BALANCE is consistent with principles like EQ, it does not 
say that S might be in a situation where believing p and believing ¬p are both 
rationally permissible. It also does not say that, when S is permitted but not required 
to believe p, she is also permitted to suspend on p. This is because S might have 
conclusive evidence for p, yet have reasons to consider p that are perfectly 
counterbalanced by reasons to ignore p. (More on this below.) What BALANCE does say 
is simply that S might be in a situation where believing p and suspending on p are both 
rationally permissible.5  
Are there situations like this? I think there might be. To see why, imagine looking 
at an eye chart. At the top of the chart, there is a very large, perfectly clear ‘E.’ At the 
bottom, there a bunch of letters, but they look like dots. The transition from the 
perfectly clear ‘E’ at the top of the chart to the blurry dots at the bottom is very 
                                                                                                                                                                           
could avoid this result if EQ is true, EQ does not present us with the dilemma we get from the assumption 
that reasons to suspend always trump reasons to believe. 
5 As we will see below, in the case where S has conclusive evidence for p, but also has reasons to consider p 
that are perfectly counterbalanced by reasons to ignore p, BALANCE will say that believing p and taking no 
attitude toward p are both permissible, while withholding with respect to p and believing ¬p are both 
impermissible. 
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gradual. What happens as you move from the top of the chart to the bottom, as the 
letters become increasingly hard to see?  
Let ‘L’ range over the 26 letters of the alphabet. Say that a letter on the chart is 
transparent just in case, for some value of ‘L,’ you are rationally required to believe that it’s 
an L; say that a letter on the chart is opaque just in case, for some value of ‘L,’ you are 
rationally required to withhold with respect to the proposition that it’s an L; and say that 
a letter on the chart is translucent just in case, for some value of ‘L,’ you are rationally 
permitted to believe that it’s an L, but not rationally required to believe that it’s an L, 
since you are also rationally permitted to withhold with respect to the proposition that it’s 
an L. The letters at the bottom of the chart are all (we can suppose) opaque while the 
large ‘E’ at the top is transparent. But what about the letters in the middle? Are they 
all either opaque or transparent? The letters get easier to see as you move from the 
bottom of the chart to the top. Is it plausible that, as you move from the bottom to 
the top, the first transparent letters follow immediately after the last opaque letters? This 
would be plausible if the letters on each line were much larger than the letters on the 
line below them. But we can suppose that they aren’t. What should we say about the 
letters in the middle of the chart, then, supposing that the transition from the opaque 
letters at the bottom to the transparent letters at the top is very gradual?  
The obvious thing to say, it seems to me, is that at least some of the letters in the 
middle of the chart are translucent. I find this conclusion just as plausible as the claim 
that, if your reasons for performing some action equal your reasons for not 
performing that action, you will be rationally permitted to perform that action, but 
not rationally required to perform it, since refraining from performing that action will 
also be rationally permissible. Imagine an archery competition. At each station you 
can shoot or refrain from shooting. Some of the targets are very close. You can’t miss 
them. Other targets are very far. You can hardly see them, much less hit them. The 
rest of the targets are various distances in between. You gain a point for every target 
you hit, you lose a point for every target you miss, and you neither gain nor lose a 
point when you refrain from shooting at a target. We can easily fill in the details of 
this case so that, at some of the stations, you are rationally permitted to shoot, but not 
rationally required to shoot, since refraining would also be rationally permissible. But 
the same seems true of the eye chart. At the top of the chart, your evidence demands 
belief, and thus supports belief over suspension. At the bottom of the chart, your 
evidence demands suspension, and thus supports suspension over belief. Somewhere 
in the middle, (surely) your evidence supports belief and suspension equally well. But 
in this case, don’t we have a translucent letter? This question is important because, if 
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there is a translucent letter on the chart, then there are cases where one is rationally 
permitted to take multiple doxastic attitudes toward a proposition. Reflecting on cases 
like the eye chart case, it seems plausible that one might be rationally permitted to take 
multiple doxastic attitudes toward a proposition, since it seems plausible that one’s 
evidence might support belief and suspension equally well. The fact that BALANCE 
entails that one may be rationally permitted to take multiple doxastic attitudes toward 
a proposition is thus arguably a virtue of the view, not a vice.6  
3. Rational Inattention 
Cohen’s third and final objection to BALANCE is that it will often get the wrong result 
in cases where someone is simply not considering a proposition. There are only three 
doxastic attitudes that S might take toward a proposition: she can believe it, she can 
believe its negation, and she can suspend. According to BALANCE, S is rationally 
required to believe p if her reasons to believe p are stronger than her reasons to not 
believe p, and she is rationally required to suspend on p if her reasons to suspend on p 
are stronger than her reasons to not suspend on p. As Cohen points out, however, S 
doesn’t take any attitude towards p if she never considers p. And this is a problem, 
says Cohen, because S is not rationally required to take any attitude toward p unless 
she is considering p. As he puts it,  
the permitted/required distinction looks very different for belief than it does for action. In the 
case of action, the distinction hinges on the relative strength of one’s reasons to do A and not to 
do A—between having sufficient reasons and having conclusive reasons. In the case of belief, the 
distinction between requirement and permission is not a distinction between sufficient and 
conclusive reasons. One is rationally permitted to believe p just in case one’s reasons permit one to 
                                                            
6 Objection: This argument fails to distinguish between being rationally required to do something and 
knowing that one is rationally required to do it. On the right way to think about the eye chart, every letter is 
either transparent or opaque. There are no translucent letters. The letters in the middle seem translucent, of 
course, but this is only because, for each letter in the middle, it’s impossible to know whether that letter is 
transparent or opaque. Reply: This objection seems as about as plausible as the claim that there’s no such 
color as grey, that every color in the image below is either black or white, and that the colors in the middle 
only seem grey because, for each color in the middle, it’s impossible to know whether it’s black or white.   
 
 
 
Obviously, I don’t find this claim plausible.  
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believe p. Whether one is required to believe is not a further fact about one’s reasons, i.e., there is 
no such thing as having conclusive reasons to believe (where having conclusive reasons entails 
being required to believe). Being rationally required to believe is not determined by the reasons 
you have to believe. Rather it involves facts about one’s psychology. (p. 10) 
According to Cohen, the relevant fact about one’s psychology is whether one is 
attending to the question whether p. Since he thinks that rationality will never permit 
more than one doxastic attitude toward p, he concludes that “one is required to adopt 
a doxastic attitude toward p just in case one is permitted to believe p and one is 
attending to whether p” (ibid). According BALANCE, however, there is such a thing as 
having conclusive reasons to believe, since S is rationally required to believe p if her 
reasons to believe p are stronger than her reasons to not believe p.  
I agree with Cohen that S does not take any attitude towards p if she never 
considers p. I am not yet convinced, however, that there is no such thing as having 
conclusive reasons to believe. Suppose I take my son to the park. I read a book while 
he plays. When I look up I see a gun in his hand. Not a toy, but a real handgun. 
Someone left it at the park, my son found it, and now he’s now playing with it, 
oblivious to the danger. If I never attend to the question whether the gun is loaded, I 
will have no doxastic attitude toward that proposition. Does it follow that I am not 
rationally required to have any doxastic attitude toward that proposition? I want to say, 
‘no!’ I had better consider the question whether the gun is loaded, and then either 
believe that it is loaded, believe that it isn’t loaded, or suspend judgement on the 
question whether it’s loaded, depending on my evidence. If it’s clear that the gun is 
loaded, then the combination of my evidence that the gun is loaded and my reasons 
for considering the question whether the gun is loaded gives me conclusive reason to 
believe that the gun is loaded. This, I think, is intuitively the right thing to say. But if 
this is the right thing to say, then it’s false that there is no such thing as conclusive 
reason to believe.  
With respect to BALANCE and the more general question whether reasons to 
believe differ importantly from reasons to act, I am unconvinced that there is 
anything very interesting about the fact that, in addition to believing p, believing ¬p, 
and withholding with respect to p, S can also take no attitude toward p. Notice that 
choices between actions can have a similar structure. Suppose you’re sitting in the 
shade and a social scientist asks you to participate in an experiment. Participation 
involves taking a test. This test contains one question followed by three boxes marked 
‘T,’ ‘F,’ and ‘W.’ You answer the question by checking exactly one of these boxes. 
There are consequences for your choice between ‘T,’ ‘F,’ and ‘W,’ depending on the 
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truth-value of the proposition that you are asked about. If the proposition is true, 
checking the box marked ‘T’ will have the best consequences, checking the box 
marked ‘W’ will have the second best consequences, and checking the box marked ‘F’ 
will have the worst consequences. However, if the proposition is false, things go the 
other way around; checking the box marked ‘T’ will have the worst consequences, 
checking the box marked ‘W’ will have the second worst consequences, and checking 
the box marked ‘F’ will have the best consequences. You look at the question and see 
that it concerns p. What should you do? Should you check the box marked ‘T,’ check 
the box marked ‘F,’ check the box marked ‘W’—or check no box at all, which is 
tantamount to not participating in the experiment? What does BALANCE say you 
should do?  
BALANCE says basically the same thing about this case as it says about any case of 
belief. According to BALANCE, you are rationally required to check the box marked 
‘T’ (for example) just in case your reasons to check the box marked ‘T’ outweigh your 
reasons to not check the box marked ‘T.’ There are three ways to not check the box 
marked ‘T:’ you can check the box marked ‘F,’ you can check the box marked ‘W,’ 
and you can not participate in the experiment. Thus, according to BALANCE, you are 
rationally required to check the box marked ‘T’ just in case (a) your reasons to check 
the box marked ‘T’ outweigh your reasons to check the box marked ‘F,’ (b) your 
reasons to check the box marked ‘T’ outweigh your reasons to check the box marked 
‘W,’ and (c) your reasons to check the box marked ‘T’ outweigh your reasons to not 
participate in the experiment. This is point-for-point analogous to the implications of 
BALANCE for believing p. According to BALANCE, you are rationally required to believe 
p just in case (a) your reasons to believe p outweigh your reasons to believe ¬p, (b) 
your reasons to believe p outweigh your reasons to withhold with respect to p, and (c) 
your reasons to believe p outweigh your reasons to not consider the question whether 
p. 
With respect to BALANCE and the more general question whether there are 
important differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act, not considering a 
question seems perfectly analogous to not participating in the social scientist’s 
experiment. If cases where someone is not considering a question give us 
counterexamples to BALANCE, it seems that we should get analogous 
counterexamples from cases where you don’t participate in an experiment like this. I 
doubt that BALANCE will have any trouble handling cases where you don’t participate 
in an experiment like this, so I doubt that cases where someone is not considering a 
question give us counterexamples to BALANCE. But the more important point is that, 
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if BALANCE performs equally well on cases where someone is not considering a 
question and cases where someone does not participate in an experiment like this, 
then we have just discovered a similarity between reasons to believe and reasons to act. 
This is important because Cohen isn’t just arguing against BALANCE; he’s arguing that, 
because BALANCE gets the wrong results when applied to belief but not when applied 
to action, there are important differences between reasons to believe and reasons to 
act. So far as I can tell, the fact that S takes no doxastic attitude toward a proposition 
unless she considers it does not show that there are important differences between 
reasons to believe and reasons to act.7  
4. Transparency, Reasons to Believe, and Reasons to Act 
Are there are important differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act, 
then? If I were going to answer ‘yes,’ I would take a page from Richard Moran (2001), 
Jonathan Adler (2002), Nishi Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), and others, and 
argue like this:  
The question whether I should believe p is transparent to the question whether 
p is true. That is, the deliberative question whether I should believe p gives way 
to the factual question whether p is true. To answer the factual question 
whether p is true, however, I must focus entirely on my evidence for and 
against p. After all, nothing else is relevant to the truth of p. This means that 
the question whether I should believe p depends entirely on my evidence. The 
question whether I should do A does not depend entirely on my evidence, 
however. (Among other things, it also depends on my values—if not the 
values I do have, then at least on the values that I should have.) Reasons to 
believe and reasons to act differ in at least this respect, then: the former 
depend entirely on evidence while the latter do not.  
The first premise of this argument (what people usually call ‘transparency’) is 
standardly taken as a datum, and this argument seems pretty plausible downstream 
from this premise. I suspect, however, that transparency is false.  
Suppose you and I have exactly the same evidence for p but we disagree about 
whether we should believe p or withhold. Suppose further that our disagreement 
                                                            
7 On page 8, Cohen says this: “if only one attitude is permitted, isn’t that attitude required? The analogous 
point is true for action. If only one act is permitted, then that act is required. The reason for this is that you 
have to do something. You can only not do A by doing something else. Belief is different.” But is it really 
true that you can only not do A by doing something else? Can’t you not do A by not doing anything at all?  
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stems entirely from a disagreement about epistemology. We disagree about the 
minimum amount of evidence required for justified or rational belief. We agree that 
we have exactly evidence e for p, we agree that the probability of p on e is exactly n (for 
some value of ‘n’ < 1), and so on; it’s just that you think e is sufficient evidence for 
rational or justified belief in p while I think the threshold is higher. Both of us realize 
that we don’t know exactly where the threshold lies. In this case, can either of us 
answer the question whether we should believe p by focusing entirely on our evidence? 
Arguably, ‘no.’ Consider an analogy. Suppose we agree that we have exactly ten 
gallons of gas left in our tank, and we also agree that our car gets exactly 35 miles per 
gallon, but we disagree about whether we should stop to get more gas because we 
disagree about the distance to our destination. Attempting to answer the question 
whether we should believe p by focusing entirely on our evidence seems analogous to 
attempting to answer the question whether we should stop to get more gas by 
focusing entirely on the amount already in our tank. Arguably, just as the amount of 
gas in our tank cannot, all by itself, settle the question whether we should get more 
gas, our evidence for p cannot, all by itself, settle the question whether we should 
believe p. To answer that question, we must do some epistemology. We must answer 
the question (to some satisfactory degree of precision) how much evidence is enough evidence 
for rational or justified belief.8 But for many values of ‘p,’ this question will be completely 
irrelevant to the factual question whether p is true. 
Why do we theorize about rationality, justification, and other epistemic statuses? 
Epistemology exists, I suspect, because the deliberative question whether I should 
believe p does not always give way to the factual question whether p is true. Or, at 
least, I suspect this is at least part of the explanation why epistemology exists. But if 
so, then epistemology exists at least in part because transparency is false. 
Transparency, however, is the basis of what I think is the best argument for an 
important difference between reasons to believe and reasons to act. This leaves me 
unsure whether there are important differences between reasons to believe and 
reasons to act. 
I agree with a lot in “Reasons to Believe and Reasons to Act.” Cohen spends most 
of the paper arguing that Schroeder’s cases involving practical interests, forthcoming 
evidence, and the mental resources required for forming a belief do not provide clear 
examples of non-evidential reasons to withhold, and arguing that, even if they did, 
                                                            
8 And notice that the answer to this question may turn on the values of true belief, false belief, and no belief, 
respectively. This might be the case even if these values are not affected by changes in one’s practical 
circumstances. See, for example, Riggs (2003).  
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these reasons would often be inoperative. I agree with Cohen on both of these points. 
But Cohen draws two conclusions from these points that I am not sure follow: that 
BALANCE runs into trouble when applied to belief, and that there are important 
differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act. To me, it still seems an 
open question whether BALANCE is plausible when applied to belief, and whether 
there are important differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act.    
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